Based on a classical political economy, on Latin American structuralism and on Gramscian perspective about the state this paper argues that national economic strategies are formed by particular interactions between institutions and economic structures and evolve according to social conflicts in a non neutral international environment. This idea is explored to interpret the rise of the developmental state in some national development strategies experienced by peripheral countries during the highest convergence period of the Golden Age and its crisis and redefinitions during the greatest divergence phase and neoliberal reforms of the last two decades of last century.
Introduction
The diffusion of industries to several peripheral countries after the Second War and the great divergence between them since the eighties has sparked wide debate on economic development. Interpretations based on neoclassical and on institutional economics (with different degrees of proximity to neoclassical economics) 1 are the major field of historical explanations. Despite the wide differences they have on the determinants of economic growth, they share a common perspective about three basic aspects: The first is the supposition that strategies of development are built by a set of government policies and by institutions that model private behaviors (of course they disagree on what policies and institutions promote economic development); the second assumes a "methodological nationalism" 2 in which individual countries growth performance are explained by domestic factors. The third is the corollary of the two above perceptions and says that the state as a major inductor of positive change (in
• Associate Professor at IE, UFRJ, and CNPQ's grantee. 1 . For a recent classification of the institutionalist approach, see Fine (2005) 2 For an original reference to this expression, see Gore (1996) , see also Medeiros (1997) resource allocation as in the heterodox reasoning, or in creation of market institutions as in orthodox thought) is responsible for success or failure of growth strategy. For the mainstream school wrong policies taken by populist state plays the dominant role, wrong policies taken by liberal or neoliberal states plays this role by heterodox. For both a meritocratic Weberian state is central to the successful strategies of development (to avoid cases rent-seeking according to neoclassical authors; to discipline large firms according to the institutionalists) 3 .
Stemming from a methodological perspective based on classical political economy, on Latin American structuralism and on Gramscian perspective about the state 4 , this paper takes a critical stance concerning these three basic aspects. At first it considers that modern explanations about developmental states and the role of institutions neglects the different challenges and circumstances created by initial conditions and how different economic and social structures influences institutions (a bias opposed to ECLAC's classical structuralism that neglected the autonomous role of institutions). The major challenge to explain development strategies is to articulate the two dimensions 5 . Secondly, it assumes the proposition according to which the international environment is not identical for developing nations and is influenced by the hegemonic state's economic and political action, creating different development opportunities for them. Finally, it considers that the state cannot be viewed as an agent above interests, apart from social classes and relations with other states, but rather, as a central institution where the dominant class or some of its sectors leads a coalition of power and builds a hegemonic project compatible with a particular accumulation strategy.
Besides this introduction this paper has three main sections. In the next two sections there is an attempt to illustrate some of these issues from an analysis of national patterns of industrialization and development strategies experienced by peripheral countries both during the highest convergence period and the greatest divergence phase.
The third and last section explores some new attempts to rebuild a "neo-developmental state".
3 Skocpol (1985) is an essential reference for the Weberian approach. 4 This tradition has a large influence in some contemporaneous analysis of globalization like Jessop (2002) , Morton (2007) and broad perspectives on capitalist state and institutions like the social structure of accumulation theory (SSA), Mc Donough, Reich and Kotz (2010) .
5 By development strategy we follow Gereffi (1990) : "Development strategies can be defined as sets of government policies that shape a country's relationship to the global economy and that affect the domestic allocation of resources among industries and major social groups" Gereffi (1990:23) National Development Strategies in the Golden Age of Post-War. The
Formation of Developmental States (DS)
6 .
The partial and limited diffusion of industrialization in the postwar period (especially, among industries and activities closer to the innovative businesses such as capital goods sector) was a consequence of national strategies led by developmentoriented states specifically geared to reproduce -in backward economies -modern industry and its infrastructure as the main engine of economic growth.
Under U.S. hegemony and under the geopolitical of the cold war, national development was basically an accumulation strategy and a hegemonic project of industrial national capital coordinated by national states favoring the formation of large industrial companies and their markets. National developmental strategies were followed in several countries and took different routes according to the size of the economy, the natural resource base, income distribution, geopolitical insertion (i.e., associated with higher or lower degree of ambition and political and military autonomy), the political power underlying that strategy and the unequal opportunities created by more developed countries. How successful those strategies were depended on the combination of those internal and external circumstances 7 .
At distinct levels of success a few countries (in Latin America, especially Brazil and Mexico, in Asia, the Asian Tigers -especially Korea and Taiwan -the Southwestern Asian countries, India and China) followed a path somehow similar to 6 The internationally consecrated formulation about the Developmental State is Johnson's (1982) . It discusses the post-war Japanese state, having as a central focus the coordination of new industries investments coordinated by the state through selective intervention. Studies done by Amsden (1989) , Chang (2006) about Korea and Wade (1990) follow this approach. The emphasis is put on the state power to discipline big business. What makes these studies essentially "state-centric" is the absence of hypotheses on why companies accept the tasks and act according to the direction of the state. Kohli (2005) identifies as developmental states a kind of cohesive capitalist state formed in countries like Korea or Taiwan very different of others social formations as Brazil or Mexico where a fragmented a multiclass state was formed. Here we consider as developmental state a state geared to change the economic status quo favoring the construction of new productive industrial capacity through state companies, public banks and coordination mechanisms. In this sense Brazil and Mexico and even Argentina that never built an encompassing and powerful developmental state -a cohesive capitalist state as put by Kohli (2005) had during the post war a state motivated by a strategic rationality to promote industrialization. But we consider that the success of this strategy depends less on design and more how they are implemented and this depends on internal interests, conditioned upon economic structures and the action of the hegemonic state.
what industrialized countries had experienced to restructure during the post-war period.
An attempt was made to transplant the key industries typical of the American manufacture pattern -metal mechanics, automobiles and chemicals -and their consumption patterns -centered on consumption durable goods financed by credit.
These industries, along with urbanization and its services and infrastructure created in agrarian economies what Hirschman (1958) defined as a new "multidimensional conspiracy for development" as its expansion would generate a chain of effects on productive sectors and technological improvements that would engender economic development. As Prebisch (1949) remarked, the typical Keynesian post-war policies on the periphery would require structural change so as to offset the external constraints, and building new capital stock in the industrial sector would be the basis for a policy directed to high growth and unemployment reduction.
Between 1950 and 1980, the steady increase in per capita income in those countries -higher than the world average rate and U.S. rate, the country leader 8 -was chiefly due to the increased pace of the industrial output growth and the transfer of surplus labor in agriculture to urban activities led by industry and services. In countries where this shift was greater, as in Korea or Brazil, the growth rate was higher, and in countries where it was less intense, as in India, the rate of growth of income per capita and per employed person was lower 9 .
Despite the diversity of initial conditions within those countries, they faced the challenges caused by large technological gap in relation to industrialized countries, the narrowness of domestic markets, the problems of coordination and financing of complementary blocks of investments in new sectors and restrictions on balance of payments 10 .
Similarly to what happened in Western Europe in the postwar period, the influence of industrial success in the Soviet Union gave major political legitimacy to the long-term planning; thus, the Government planning boards became pilot agencies with a major influence on economic policy. But the national strategies of industrialization were 8 Although generalized this reduction was very unbalanced amongst countries and regions according to the initial levels of development (greater in Latin-American countries, smaller in Asian countries), product and population growth rates. 9 The discussion between industrial product growth rate and GDP growth rate was analytically studied by Kaldor (1996) and is widely renowned in unorthodox development literature 10 The analysis of questions regarding the implementation of modern industries in farm-based societies was the main focus of the study on "the pioneers of development economy" such as Rosestein Rodan, Nurkse, Lewis, Hirschman, Furtado and Prebisch, inducing a new meaning to development economy. A new work among the classic collection is the recently reedited Agarwala and Singh (2010 (Haggard, Maxfield, 1993) . Until the 1970s, the external financing was scarce and the constraint on foreign currency imposed strict control on foreign exchange, control of imports, encouraged exports and policies that proved to be a strategic element to the national development-oriented routes.
However, in spite of common strategies, the countries that started their industrial diversification processes in the post-war period followed different patterns and their states had different capacity to induce structural change. Two aspects stand out from pattern differences: the levels of income distribution associated with the industrialization process of (inequality in Latin America was much higher than in Asia), and the share of industrial exports in countries' total exports (much higher in Asia).
Besides these structural dimensions, one important difference was the role played by foreign capital larger in Argentina, Brazil or Mexico than in Korea, Taiwan or India.
11 Not only in China and India that had an independent and particular position during the cold war but even in peripheral countries like Brazil and Argentina arms production and pacific nuclear technology were developed as part of security and development strategy. 12 State intervention is a phenomenon that has been common across the development experience, in the successful cases as well as the failures. "States (…) thus differ not so much in their orientation toward the economy (…) but in their capacity to bring about the desired results" (Chibber, 2003: p. 6 ).
Considering the State's power to induce the economy one may observe that although the common base was a coalition between the military, technocratic planners, and the private manufacture sector 13 this coalition was stronger in Korea or Taiwan than in other countries 14 . In these countries a "cohesive capitalist" state (Kohli, 2004) was built by dislodging the landed owners and with strong support of US in their strategy of communist contention in Asia. It was also influenced by Japanese' institutions and business strategy developed after the war. The development state outside Asia was more "fragmented and multiclass" and the industrial sector had to compromise some economic policies with powerful land owners.
Different Patterns
Unlike Western European countries, industrialization in peripheral countries led by developmental states was not accompanied by social democratic coalitions aiming at the distribution of income and full employment 15 . However, despite the fact that the goals for greater equity were subordinated to the goals for growth and industrialization, income distribution was quite uneven according to the different social coalitions supported in the state. The social coalitions, i.e., the economic interests prevailing in the hegemonic project 16 of national developmental age, and the pattern of income distribution were essentially influenced by the way the land property and the modernization of agricultural production evolved. In countries where the productivity in food production 17 was lower, the lower was the peasant's income and the heavier was 13 Despite the great differences in the role played by these different groups in the state. 14 Here is interesting to follow Jessop (2002) Similarly, export performance followed a distinct path.
In Asia, the import substitution was quickly followed (as early as in the 1960s) by industrial exports (mainly textiles and clothing in the early stages), generating a greater trade diversification and consequent positive effect on the balance of payments. In Latin America, the diversification of exports happened much more slowly and less intensively (and even so, only in some countries, notably in Brazil this occurred in late 1960s). What distinguishes these approaches is the lack of connection between strategies, institutions and economic structure. Using an argument similar to that employed by Diamand (1986) in the case of Argentina, by Mahon (1992) and more recently by 18 A classical study is made by Anibal Pinto (1973) on the great structural heterogeneity of Latin America. Here we consider internal structural heterogeneity the productivity gap between food production and industrial goods and by external productivity or unbalanced economic structure the productivity gap between primary export sector and industry. See ahead. 19 In Argentina land concentration came together with high productivity in food production generating a unequal but rich economy for Latin American standards. The political power of the agrarian class in Argentina had by its turn a strong influence on state policies during de developmental years. In Mexico land reform had little influence on income distribution because the best lands remained concentrate in few hands and the lack of public investment collaborate to keep productivity in a very low level. 20 A good synthesis was made by Fishlow (1991) . 21 Explicitly underlined in the 1953 CEPAL document. For discussion see Pazos (1984) Bresser-Pereira (2010), here we claim that among countries with highly competitive export industries based on natural resources such as those of Latin America, there came to be an external heterogeneity or an "imbalance in the production structure" between the productivity of the primary export sector and that of the industrial sector. This imbalance led to the formation of an uncompetitive exchange rate for the industry contributing for the specialization of the export sector. Industrial policies favored domestic industry through preferential exchange rates and tariffs, but they were not as competitive as it was in Asia for industrial exports. The interests involved in this strategy clearly were much more solid than were those generated by such a different economic structure as the one that prevailed in the most dynamic Asian countries 22 .
In Latin America, the high share of exports based natural resources exacerbate a distributive conflict between primary exporters, industrial sector, non tradable support activities and the working class on the exchange rate. This was particular intense in Argentina due to its bigger external heterogeneity and higher labor militancy.
Thus, the higher cohesiveness around manufacture exports (and industrial interests)
was not simply matter of institutions but an outcome from the economic structure.
In Asia, for a small group of countries like Korea, Taiwan that had during the 1960s a lower level of industrialization than Argentina Brazil or Mexico, and certainly city-states like Hong Kong and Singapore, the scarcity of natural resources made the export of industrial products the obligatory path toward industrialization, whether due to the low size of the domestic market (as in the case of Taiwan and the city-states) or, as in the case of all the others, due to the need to finance their import capacity 23 . Poor natural resources basis was favorable to a more balanced economic structure, making it possible to establish a real exchange rate more favorable to industry. Secondly, because of the political situation resulting from the Cold War, these countries relied on heavy U.S. support during the initial provision of external funding and of a preferential market for their exports.
Thus, the Asian industrial strategies did not distinguish themselves for having adopted policies and instruments very different from those used in Brazil or Mexico 24 . 22 The above argument does not mean that in Latin America a permanent and overall appreciated real exchange rate prevailed (Sachs, ) after midi sixties many countries adopted exchange rate devaluation policies. What here is stressing is that the absolute level of exchange rate was not competitive for the manufacture sector due to the higher productivity of the commodity export sector (Diamand, Bresser) 23 In Medeiros and Serrano (2001) , the role of exports in growth trajectories according to their distinct productive structures is discussed. 24 One may consider that the creation of maquiladora (in-bond) in Mexico occurred in 1965 as in Taiwan
The State was not more or less interventionist in the induction, coordination and subsidization of private investment 25 ; however, due to dissimilar structural and geopolitical circumstances, this policy has yielded different macroeconomic and social results.
In these countries, the composition and transformation of the export structure generated a larger and more diversified sector of industrial tradables and a stable exchange rate. The dominance of industrial sector (led by coalition of big business and the State) over other fractions of capital was much more secure than in other developing nations. The main conflict between industrial capitalist and working class was suppressed politically by an authoritarian State but economically the evolution of real wage was sustained by a simultaneous rise in food and industry productivities.
This fact 26 had important consequence for the easier way that Asian countries reacted to the debt crisis of 1980, but it had already manifested itself with the pattern of indebted growth followed by Brazil, Mexico and Korea in the 1970s 27 .
28
During the seventies, despite the dollar over borrowing that was spread in periphery (India is an exception), the differences within Latin America Countries and within Asian countries were very sharp in contrast with the situation that took place after the 1980s marked by a regional clustering. After the first oil shock and during all the 1970s Argentina with a fragile balance of payment position and strong working class had high rate of inflation exacerbating its structural dilemma; Mexico interrupted a cycle of "stabilizing development" and pressed by the political turmoil of the late sixties, initiated a distributive strategy in a unstable path until the discovery of new reserves of oil and huge accumulation of external debt. Brazil and Korea had a different strategy and used the availability of cheap money to launch an industrial plan aimed to import substitution in heavy industry and chemicals.
25 "It is by now well known that the favorite neoclassical showcase of South Korea is not predominantly one of market liberalism but of aggressive and judiciously selective state intervention. The Korean state has heavily used the illiberal compliance mechanisms of selective command and administrative discretion, restricting imports for industrial promotion, disciplining the private sector through control over domestic credit, foreign exchange and underwriting of foreign borrowing, and public enterprise leading the ways in many areas" Bardhan (1988:62) . 26 Chibber (2003) develops the implications of this characteristic on the greater ability of the exporting Asian States to discipline large corporations to comply with industrial policy orientation. 27 Although the ratio of debt to GDP was not very different in Korea and Brazil, the ratio of debt service to export that captures better the country external solvency was much lower in where there was a predominance of primary exports, high income concentration based on the differences between rural areas and cities also occurred. 
Neoliberalism and the Crisis of the Developmental Nation States
The Reagan-Thatcher offensive against the National Keynesian State in the central nations, the external-debt crisis at the periphery and the collapse of the USSR in 1991, at a time at which a new technological revolution based on information and telecommunication was rising, led to significant changes in the international division of labor. Under unrestrained competition finance and productive internationalization greatly enlarged 29 .
The "Washington- Among the industrialized nations, the large corporations, exposed to intense international competition, sought greater autonomy from the state, the workers and the chain of domestic suppliers, simultaneously demanding greater state support for the globalization process of production and finance in new spatial and regional 29 "The breakdown of communism eliminated a competing model, which had obliged most Western leaders to respect some kind of equilibrium between the worlds of capital and labour. In addition, the crisis and fall of the Soviet Union gave way to rapid impoverishment of the countries of the former socialist bloc and to disarray in most of the Third World. The end of the Eastern bloc and the rapid liberalization of certain parts of the Chinese economy, in the early 1990s, further consolidated the globalization of neoliberalism". (2007:29) denominates a "Schumpeterian competitive state" a "state that aims to secure economic growth within its borders and/or to secure competitive advantages for capitals based in its borders, even where they operate abroad, by promoting the economic and extra economic conditions that are currently deemed vital for success in competition with economic actors that and spaces located in other states." (p. 96).
32 For discussions on these formulations see Serrano (2004) and Glyn (2006) . 33 The liberating pressure was particularly strengthened in the environment of the WTO in the Uruguay Round started in the 1980s. Similarly as it was happened with national Keynesianism, development strategies based on industry and on the nation as the prevailing scale of accumulation were abandoned in many countries and a new hegemonic project led by the economic domination of cosmopolitan capital was established.
Despite the differences observed in time and space, the discontinuity in development strategy involved two major forces: financial openness and big business revulsion against the developmental state 34 .
34 "In CEE the restructuring of market-state relations has been the most sweeping. While the economic changes were more profound than anywhere else -moving from a socialist model to neoliberal capitalism -they also were implemented faster. Within less than a decade (the 1990s) the transition was a fact, and the region had opened up to global private capital. Most of the former socialist countries in Europe have decisively distanced themselves from the ex-Soviet Union and have been linking up to the European Union, either as new members (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or as candidate members (Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia)". Hogenboorn, 2007: 30) Financial opening played an important role for the crisis and discontinuity of national developmental strategies (in both industrialized and, mainly, semiindustrialized nations) insofar as it exposed the economies to volatile capital inflows and dissolved the role of domestic credit as a mechanism for coordinating investments.
The developmental coalitions supporting state intervention was supplanted by a "more orthodox and internationalist policy factions and pushes toward liberalizing reforms"
(Haggard, Maxfield, p. 325). It was in the wake of the exchange-rate crises that WC structural reforms were massively introduced 35 . The institutional position of the Central Bank (with an exclusive focus on price stability) was strongly enlarged due to international constraints that followed the external crisis and the role played by manufacture interests and its institutions was diminished.
As a corollary to these macroeconomic and institutions change there was a split - 36 As observed earlier the discipline of big business and the State influence on investment decision was the essential characteristic of developmental states. 37 In Medeiros (2009) privatization as a form of organizing "big business" is discussed. 38 "in Korea, the giant conglomerates (the chaebols) have aggressively campaigned during the 1990s to convince the population that the government should abandon its industrial policy and financial regulation" Chang, 2006:253. concentration. The social cohesion and political legitimacy of industry-based accumulation strategies and, consequently, the hegemony of this project were profoundly shaken 39 .
But this general trend was far from being homogenous and a great divergence took place.
In Latin America and in some East European countries, the debt crisis of the eighties was intense bringing about high inflation rate and deep recession. This caused a structural crisis in prevailing State led growth and created new coalitions of internal and external interests -remaking the bloc of finance and primary export that ruled LA in the XIX century-around the agenda of reforms of the Washington Consensus that spread all over the region in the nineties. (Medeiros, 2008a) In Asia, the external shock of the eighties was not so disruptive. In large countries
as China or India, the debt ratio was too low to make any substantial negative impact (Hughes and Singh, 1991) . In East and on South-East countries, thanks to better solvency ratios, the surge of Japanese investments and the clustering of production what he calls the "political school" (Johnson, 1982) , to the "economic school," (the main institutional authors such as Chang, Amsden, or Stiglitz and Rodrik). For the former, the developmental state was a singular historical construction that lost its functionality with the success of development. For the latter authors, the State crisis it derived from the financial opening and the lack of adaptation of institutions to the new environment; for others, such as Chang, the financial opening destroyed the basic mechanism of investments coordination. For Wade (1998) the crisis was the result of American pressure on Asian institutions. Here we assume some of aspects mentioned in these approaches, but considers them under a different light in respect to the relationship between the state and capital, emphasizing the change in interest of large economic groups and their strategic alliances.
and from a trajectory of high growth. Other Asian countries like China, Taiwan or India did not dismantle the main developmental institutions. Political and structural reasons contributing for this different route.
Thus, the degree and impact of these changes on national developmental strategies essentially depended on the extension and circumstances of the external crisis, the resistance of the previous economic and political coalition to the new challenges and the capacity for structural transformation of the economies. The production structure, the existence of distinct regional dynamics and the power and political cohesion of the nation-states were the main vectors for a strong differentiation occurred between Asian and Latin American Countries.
Different Paths
Throughout the 1990s, it was possible to identify various reactions to the 40 "Within the context of the above-mentioned structural heterogeneity, LA has developed two types of successful "modern-sector" regional oligopolies: those involved in large scale capital intensive commodity production for exports, and those that have mastered the technique of organizing low-valueadded labour intensive production chains-sometimes for exports (most agricultural products) and sometimes in services(eg. retail)" Palma (2010:33) 41 The Chilean "Chicago boys" during the Pinochet Government were the first technopols group to lead a radical economic change in the continent, in services. In Argentina this 'capitalization of foreign debt' was devised in 1985, though initially it was not associated with privatizations but with the transfer of private debt to the state, which had not been done before when the exchange insurance regime was applied. Added to this were other subsidizing schemes of large companies, such as state overvaluation of purchases of goods and services, and other mechanisms. It is estimated that total state transfers to the more concentrated capital amounted to $105 billion in the period 1981-9, a magnitude similar to the total yearly gross national product (GNP) of Argentina. The main beneficiaries of these regimes were economic groups or conglomerates such as Pérez-Companc, Techint, Siemens and FIAT" (pg 174) 45 This resistance was only partial. Along the nineties there was a disarticulation of some productive chains and the abandon of some innovation intensive activities creating a kind of "regressive specialization" (Coutinho, 1997) although some modern capital goods manufactures more integrated with mineral and raw material resources were preserved. 46 The power of private banks in Brazil has a long history. During the sixties commercial banks were forbidden to compete on interest bearing demand deposit accounts allowing a great inflation bonus. This can be understood as a political exchange in face of an active state intervention on credit allocation trough state banks. But until the eighties the influence was lower then what became later. The state owned Banco do Brazil that had an unlimited overdraft privileges ("movement account") and with the support of industrialist acted as a countervailing force against monetarist policies usually hold by Central Bank. A big change occurred in 1986 when under a coalition of interests formed by Brazilians private banks, the Central Bank, the World Bank and foreign banks this privilege was extinguished (Armijo, 1993) . In the eighties the financial sector earned a large inflation bonus from demand deposits -that paid no interestinvesting funds in high-yielding treasury bonds. As observed by Armijo (1993) In Russia and East Europe, the crisis of socialism was also accompanied by a "rebellion" of the elites -the "revolution from above" as Kotz and Weir (1998) stated it -, particularly of the executives of the large corporations. A violent, primitive capital accumulation was established involving the new sectors and private economic groups that prospered by the transition to capitalism (agriculture, oil and natural gas). In the East European nations that attracted German capital, a new specialization process in labor-intensive industrial activities was initiated, and foreign financing was resumed, affirming, here also, the "integrationist" way.
An essential feature of this strategy was a macroeconomic regime based on monetary stability, cut in public expenditures (mainly investment) and financial openness. This led to substantial valorization of the real exchange rate and high interest rate. The power of financial sector in these countries enlarged not only because its assets grew faster in the decade but because its main interest -higher interest rate and low rate of inflation-has predominate on economic policy. Due to high levels of external debt and growing influence of IMF on domestic policies, this finance domination was expressed in orthodox Central Banks that assumed in these countries the "commanding heights" of the economy.
Some of these changes and the demise of the developmental state also occurred in Korea in the beginning of the nineties 48 and in many Asian countries after 1997-8
hold treasury bills" (p.282). After this decade not only the interest rate set by Central Bank has been much higher than the rate observed in other countries, but the spread is incomparable high as well. There is no agreement about this last feature but one may observe that contrary of what happened in Argentina or Mexico, the financial sector in Brazil was not denationalized and the big domestic banks prospered as the main dealer of Brazilian internal debt.
47 "During the 1990s, Brazil's industrial elite withdrew without much conflict from areas attractive to international investors: industrialised food production and distribution, supermarket chains and automobile spare parts in the beginning of the decade and, later, telecommunications, advanced services and financial institutions. The industrial elite has either migrated to the tertiary sector or retreated from business altogether, investing their capital in the financial market, pension funds or real estate. Other possibilities were 'support activities' such as the building sector, packaging industry, car sales concessionaires, activities related to business and law consulting, business promotion, educational and cultural events, administrative and honorific positions in the 'third sector' (NGOs) and the administration of real estate". (Rocco, 2007:208) 48 The dissolution of the powerful Economic Planning Board into the Ministry of Finance and Economy was the milestone of the new State.
external crisis hit. Throughout the 1990s, several Asian nations followed a mix strategy based on industrial inducements and on IDE and exports integrate in commodity chains in a flying geese model. Korea under American pressures opened its financial system eliminating the role hitherto exerted by Government on credit and investment. Big chaebols decided that the government intervention was a hindrance to new economic opportunities. Other less developed countries in Southeast Asia follow a similar liberal road.
The national development strategy was not fully changed in China, and India (both with military power and autonomous geopolitical presence) and Taiwan or
Singapore that followed a path of greater autonomy or of greater resistance, preserving the national developmental strategy and its hegemonic project in a new context.
Although relinquishing some previous economic regulation mechanisms, the developmental state in dynamic East Asian countries survived.
In the case of China, this route -"independent" according to Amsden's (2001) classification-was based upon greater resistance to abandoning the national In face of these circumstances, three different strategies were taken by developing countries. Two of them were not very different from the route took in the nineties. The first, a "passive and integrationist" strategy as the one taken by Mexico and some East European countries in the nineties was a mere continuation and gained more support despite its weak results 49 . The second, a "neo-developmental" strategy taken by China, Taiwan, Singapore or even India explored the new opportunities to up grade their industrial structure including new policies without radical change in their previous mechanisms of industrial and finance regulation. The macro policies (public spending, rate of interest, exchange rate) are subordinate to industrial change aimed to reduce the technological gap. 49 In Mexico, the insurgence of radical rural-based movements did not alter the fundamental social coalition and development model based on a passive strategy dependent on FDI and on the American market built along the nineties. The same conditions prevailed during the last years generating in consequence low and export dependent growth, high emigration and continuous deterioration of state institutions. In East Europe, the road taken by many countries in order to access to European Union increase as well a passive and FDI dependent strategy.
The novelty was the third way, the road taken by some countries after the demise of their developmental state and after one decade of liberal reforms. This third route was taken by several natural resource export countries (like Argentina or Venezuela) or countries with a more diversified but unbalanced industrial sector (like Russia or Brazil). Despite their economic, political and ideological diversity these countries have been following a more pragmatic economic policy. A higher and more diversified economic growth and social progress led by internal markets and higher wages have been achieved in these countries without direct or strong efforts to change their pattern of trade specialization. Due to its emphasis put on economic development through horizontal Keynesian policies without direct or discretionary State intervention to promote industrial change, we may call it a "neo-Keynesian" route.
Let's explore the making and the limits of these strategies.
As has been here argued, institutions and mechanisms for coordinating production were created to solve the problems of industrialization according to the specificity of production sectors, their entrenched political interests and technological stages 50 .
Although the institutions required for coordinating and transplanting industrial sectors Based on these new challenges, a "neo development strategy" was developed, in the countries that knew how (or were able) to resist external and internal pressures adopted, aiming at continuing the "catch-up" strategy.
In Asia, this new strategy was mainly followed by China that strongly combined public investment in infra-structure-the main inducer of overall growth productivitywith a selective industrial policy in ITT technologies in an expansionist macroeconomics. This includes a low rate of interest, an anti-cyclical fiscal policy and the maintenance of a competitive rate of exchange. The subordination of finance and enterprises to the development goals defined by State was achieved trough the maintenance of political centralization, solid institutions and by the leadership state enterprises in the "commanding heights" of the economy 52 . In India, with a much more fragmented society some of old regulations instruments were also preserved favoring a less ambitious but nevertheless active industrial policy.
As we have been observing along this paper, a strategy is not only the outcome of State decision but its coherence is social and structural conditioned. In Korea after the liberal reforms implemented in the midst of an ample IMF financing adjustment, the previous industrial policies and institutions were dismantled. But the extraordinary expansion of exports (partially induced by the Chinese expansion) that followed the 1997 crisis permitted substantial reduction in sovereign debt and less interference of IMF. In this new situation some big chaebols rebuilt with the Korean state a new coalition heading in the direction of widespread industrial modernization based on innovation. A new strategy toward the internationalization of median industrial enterprises followed this path. Thus, due to a developed and homogeneous structure and pragmatic economic policy, institutional change in Korea did not interrupt its high road.
In a more interventionist Malaysia something similar happened. A neo-developmental strategy is being taking without or "beyond the developmental state." (Ben Fine, 2005) .
A neo-developmental strategy as we described has today a focus less centered on productive sector than it happened in the past and is more centered on innovation In Russia a similar situation occurred reverting the tragic 1990s' decade enabling the new Government to construct significant sovereign reserves 54 . Countries as diverse as Argentina, Brazil or Russia could achieve a higher growth pushed by the internal markets now released from the external constraints that blocked them along the nineties.
And this occurred essentially without changing the pattern of the economic growth.
Thus, various countries began constructing new development strategies situated between neo-developmental strategy based on "a second catching-up phase" and a 53 And this as we argued along this paper is conditioned by economic structure, the geopolitical position of the country and political coalitions between states and social classes. 54 With the end of the socialism and radical liberalism of the 1990s, Russia resumed national developmentalism strategy based, however, on natural resources. Thanks to its geopolitical position and greater state control over oil and natural gas exports, transfers to other sectors of the economy increased substantially; however, they did not result in greater export diversification. "Old-fashioned" policies, that is, policies based on direct state intervention, have been thriving not only, and above all, in the industrial exports of the "military industrial complex," but also in the aeronautics field.
passive and integrationist strategy. This third way, a "neo-Keynesian" tries to keep distance on the one hand, from the previous strategy of national development and, on the other, from the pro finance and liberal macroeconomic policy advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions.
Without the particular conditions that support a "high road" that we observed in some Asian countries the State in this third way has less power to induce structural change. The economic and social cohesiveness for this is missing.
In fact, for different structural and political reasons in major Latin American
Countries or East Europe the major private economic groups that in the past were the main benefiters of industrial policy are nowadays much more associate to international commodity chains in asymmetrical regional agreements and in non tradable activities Our final considerations in this paper seek to identify the scope and limits of this way in countries that, throughout the history of development mentioned here, are characterized today by a large (and growing) share of natural resources in their exports, poor infra-structure and high social polarization.
What were the main reasons for the slowdown in the economic growth in these countries in the past decades that were temporarily circumvent by the recent trends?
Although each national case has its particular history the synthesis made by MorenoBrid and Ros (2009) about the Mexican case (that had a slow growth in the last decade as well) seems to be quite accurate for a large sample of countries:
"…our argument is that the proximate of Mexico's slow growth determinant since the early 1980 is a reduced investment rate, and four factors are constraining investment: the low level of public investment (particularly in the area of infrastructure), an appreciated real exchange rate for most of the period since 1990, the dismantling of industrial policy during the reform period, and the lack of bank finance" (p.242) Thus, a comprehensive industrial policy aside (that identifies the neodevelopmental state), the main constraints and consequently major challenges to enlarge the development horizons are the low level of public investment 55 , a competitive exchange rate and the lack of bank finance. Indisputably this last factor is less general than the others, being more important in Mexico and Argentina than it is in Brazil.
The relevance of a competitive exchange rate and of the decline of public investment are nevertheless an undisputable reasons for low growth's explanations in these countries unless along non orthodox approach. In an important way they are connected: there is a strong relationship between the contraction of public investment observed in all these countries in the nineties and the growth of interest payment spending 56 ; the maintenance of a high rate of interest push this increase on debt spending (and consequently the contraction of public investment) and is the basis for the valorization of exchange rate. But although they have this important connection, we can consider two different strategies of the growth according to the emphasis attributed to the exchange rate and on public investment. We can unfold the "neo-Keynesian" 57 strategy in two roads: one, a "new developmental" strategy considers a more competitive industry sector as the main goal and a competitive exchange rate its major instrument 58 ; the other a "social democratic" has the enlargement of internal market as its main goal and public investment its main instrument 59 . Table 2 summarizes the different strategies.
Let's explore some structural dimensions of these challenges.
As aforementioned, one important dilemma in countries like Argentina, Brazil and now Russia, is the "structural imbalance" between the productivity of the primary export sector and the productivity of all domestic manufacture sector 60 . Such imbalance leads to a relatively uncompetitive exchange rate for industry. As shown during the nineties for all these countries (and nowadays in Brazil) this industrial "wrong price" is 57 The main aspect is the predominance of macro and indirect incentives. Different from the "neodevelopmental state" the state has fewer instruments and more goals to fulfill. 58 In Brazil, a basic formulation of this "new developmental" strategy is discussed in Bresser-Pereira (2010). 59 These "productive" and "distributive" strategies are not necessarily incompatible and do not correspond to any clear national case but they signalize different priorities, economic interests and strategies that are roughly in place in South America as government priorities and policies. 60 In México this unbalance is between export industry (in the processing area) and the others sectors higher when set by an autonomous finance motive made by an interest rate on the public debt above the world average.
Why could Asia preserve a competitive rate of exchange while the tendency in others countries here considered was so different? The first reason in not so different from the one observed during the post war. In poorer natural resources countries the maintenance of a devaluated currency unifies production and exports interests thus preserving the social and economic coalition focused on the exchange rate policy as part of the industrial policy.
For richer natural resources countries, the reality is different insofar as the "wrong price" for industry can be "right" for exporters of commodities and countervailing exchange rate (through taxes) policies encounters greater opposition.
Additionally, the greater income polarization in these countries increases support for a high exchange rate, which is functional for raising the real salary while keeping inflation under control. Due to its positive impact on inflation strategies, targeting an exchange rate favorable to industry face greater political obstacles led by the community of financial interests that see the stability of prices -and the inflation target regime-the main protection of their assets. Industrialists suffer the loss of external competitiveness, yet may be benefited (as in Brazil nowadays) by its positive impact on expansion of domestic demand.
The second reason is the effect of China on Asian industrial producers and on producers of raw material and food. In fact, a competitive national rate of exchange does not depend exclusively on the rate between a particular exporter country and their main consumers but on its value in relation to their competitors in those markets. Thus, the Chinese maintenance of a low but stable exchange rate after the 1997 Asian crisis when all affected countries strongly devaluated, created an important price reference for Asian countries (a floor for some countries a ceiling to others) set competitive exchange rates. China's influence on prices and consequently in terms of trade had a different effect for raw material producers contributing for the valorization of exchange rate.
In Latin America, Argentina is the only country that after the strong exchange rate devaluation after the 1999-2000' crisis kept a competitive rate of exchange until the end of the present decade. This was achieved through a tax on exports rents and capital controls. Politically these measures were supported by "Keynesian coalition" created from the shambles of the neoliberal project that ruled the country on the nineties given a larger State autonomy. Economic growth was high and was led by internal markets.
Although increasing from lower rates the expansion of public investment was important for this growth. This exchange rate had a positive impact on balance of trade avoiding growth external constraints. But besides the China' effects on terms of trade, the appreciated Brazilian rate of exchange was important -since MERCOSUR Brazil is by far the principal partner of Argentina-for this competitive overall real effective exchange rate 61 . Thus without the combination of China (enlarging its exports) and Brazil (decreasing its imports) effects Argentina hardly could sustain a high growth 61 As considered by ECLAC a country's overall real effective exchange rate index is calculated by weighting its real bilateral exchange rate indices with each of its trading partners by each partner's share in the country's total trade flows in terms of exports and imports pushed by internal markets without change its unbalanced structure. The same historical dilemma is being in place.
In Brazil, different of what happened in Argentina, and despite some positive political initiatives and income policies (minimum wages increases and pro-poor income transferences) that were enlarged since the beginning of this decade, the Government (led by Worker Party) practiced a recessive economic police until the midi of the decade 62 . With extremely high interest rate the exchange rate achieved high values. Despite this, the surge of Chinese demand for food and raw material pulled Brazilian exports sanctioning the "regressive specialization" initiated in the nineties.
But two main structural changes occurred. The internal heterogeneity declined due to large modernization of food production and the linkages of primary exports and internal markets strongly enlarged by the incorporation of the countryside lands as the main geographic export area. Non tradable activities like transport, construction, packaging industry, telecommunication, support activities, etc strongly prospered and formed important economic groups 63 .
A "Keynesian coalition" led by "desenvolvimentistas" group (that enlarged its In Russia, that like Brazil has a large and diversified domestic manufacture sector, the rebirth of nationalism was associated with new economic conditions created by the high prices of oil and gas. Thanks to its geopolitical position and greater state control over the natural resources income transfers and investments to other sectors of the economy increased substantially enlarging the internal market; however, due to the 62 Brazil has followed a tight inflation target regime, a police that in Latin America adopted as well by Chile, Colômbia, México and Peru. 63 The incorporation of new lands always cause an extension of internal markets exerting a demand on industrial capacity and infrastructure service.
lack of effective industrial policies and to an appreciated exchange rate these transferences did no result in greater export diversification.
In many small Latin America countries, the industrialization of natural resources as an alternative industrial strategy has been in discussion. The broad idea is that due to the high technological gap created by new technologies and their localization in Asian countries small Latin America countries do not have the conditions to attract and develop modern industry that could change their position on international division of labor. Nevertheless there are some possibilities to add more value to their production.
The idea is introduce more intensively general purpose technology (basically ITT and biotechnology) and adapt it to the processing of natural resources widening the demands for R&D and skilled labor. (ECLAC, 2008) This discussion also occurs in Brazil instigated by the recent discover of oil in deep waters (Pre-Salt) and the protagonist rule played by PETROBRAS, a state owned company. This high tech and capital-intensive oil extraction has important linkages for Brazilian industry, but hardly this demand policy could substantially up grade its manufacture sector unless a comprehensive industrial policy enlarges this opportunity.
Thus, the limits of a "new Keynesian" strategies of growth can be considered.
The "new-developmental" strategy aims to achieve a higher demand for manufacture export in order neutralize the unbalanced economic structure. The main target is a competitive exchange rate and the main instrument is a lower rate of interest. This newdevelopmental strategy tries to achieve a more diversified economic structure and economic dynamic led by manufacture investments and exports. This strategy is addressed to correct by macro intervention a structural problem and assumes a high substitution effect exerted by real exchange rate on manufacture sector. The state's rule is to organize the manufacture sector through pro-export macro policies. The most difficult and contradictory aspect of this strategy is the defense of a balanced budget in order to open space to cut interest rate and achieve a exchange rate real devaluation 64 .
Given the contractive effect of exchange rate devaluation on real wages accompanied by fiscal adjustment, the positive effect on growth depends on strong effect on export demand. Thus, the conflicts with the working class can increase with a negative impact on its political support. A lower interest rate can open space to public investment but this expansion can be moderate by fiscal targets. But as far as the direction of infra 64 As in Bresser (2010) structure investment is led by business interests on export sector, there is large opportunities to attract private investment in non tradable sector. This strategy has in addiction a nationalist ideology that colludes with orthodox wisdom and vested interests of finance community centered on price stabilization. Thus the making of the social and political coalition for this strategy is a real challenge.
The second strategy is also based on Keynesian policies but the emphasis is put on lower interest rate and enlarging public investment. The broad strategy is to enlarge the opportunities created by the export of primary commodities and resource based manufacturing and expands public investment in infrastructure and social sector.
Although a competitive exchange rate is necessary for the manufacture sector as put by the other route, its effect on real wage is considered as a negative factor for growth. In this route the State aim to organizes business -mainly in export sector, finance, construction, services, retailing, and real estate, etc-given priority to internal markets (reestablishing a renewed connection as in case of Brazil between exports and internal markets) but includes wider goals and a wider social and political coalition. It tries to involve larger actors that were absent from the old developmental state, and from new developmental strategy as well. The opposition from the orthodox wisdom and from finance community is larger because the direction of public spending is less induced by private interests and consequently relies more on state budget.
The most difficult challenge of this route is to achieve a productive structure efficient enough to guarantee higher wages. Thus, a more inclusive pattern of development based on higher social cohesion depends not only on achieve a political consensus on social priorities but there is a necessity to induce public investment to directions that contributes to increase the productivity of the goods and services consumed by workers. Nowadays the labor consumption pattern includes not only food and housing but modern technologies and services. But although this investment can contribute for a sustainable increase in real salary in tradable sectors without sacrificing external competitiveness, this strategy is very difficult to fulfill its main goals without a more diversified tools towards a blend of import substitution and export promotion.
Here, again, the making of the social and political coalition for this strategy is a real challenge.
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